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A multivariate approach to contract bidding strategies in the construction industry is presented.  
This represents a radical departure from previous work in the field by using all available data on 
competing bidders.  'Optimal', 'no loss' and 'break even' mark up strategies are derived and methods 
of parameter estimation proposed.  A case study shows how the three strategic mark up values are 
calculated against known competitors. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many contracts for goods and services are let on the basis of sealed bid auctions.  The usual 
conditions for the auction are that interested suppliers may enter, by a stipulated date and 
time, a bid for the amount they wish to be paid should they become a party to the contract.  
All bids are delivered separately and simultaneously in sealed envelopes to the procurer who 
then opens the envelopes.  The procurer inspects the bids and generally enters into a written 
contract with the lowest bidder based on the amount stated in the bid. 
Construction contracts are typical in this respect.  Each bidding contractor estimates his 
likely costs of carrying out the work detailed in the project plans and schedules and adds a 
percentage mark-up to form the bid value.  The value of the mark-up crucially influences the 
chances of a bidder winning the contract and the subsequent profit should the contract be 
secured and the work be completed.  Clearly, a low mark-up value should increase the chance 
of winning but decrease the profit, whilst a high mark-up should increase the profit but 
decrease the chances of winning. 
Strategic mark-up bidding assumes that the bidder applies a mark-up which happens to 
produce a satisfactory balance between the probability of the winning the contract and the 
profit generated as a result of winning the contract.  A special case of strategic mark-up 
bidding is optimal bidding, defined as applying a mark-up which happens to maximise 
expected profit, ie., the product of the probability of winning the contract and the profit 
generated as a result of winning the contract
1
. 
The literature on strategic mark-up bidding is quite extensive and several reviews have 
been published (eg 
2
).  All the work to date has been based on two bivariate models.  The 
Friedman
1
 model compares the strategic bidder with individual competitors while Hanssmann 
and Rivett
3
 compare the strategic bidder with lowest bidders.  However, the Friedman model 
has been frequently criticised as demanding unrealistic amounts of data to estimate the model 
parameters (eg 
4
) especially for construction contract auctions (eg. 
5
,  and 
6
).  The Hanssmann 
and Rivett model partially solves this by reducing the number of parameters in the model and 
thus the data demands, but with loss of predictive power. 
   
 
2 
Multivariate methods offer a means of better utilisation of all available data, depending 
on the adequacy of certain assumptions concerning the statistical properties of bids.  In this 
case an individual bidder is not restricted to data for auctions in which he has been a 
participant, as is the case with bivariate approaches.  Instead, he is able to incorporate data for 
all auctions in which his competitors, and potential competitors, have been participants, 
irrespective of the individual bidder's participation.  This increases, by several orders of 
magnitude, the amount of data available for estimating the model parameters. 
Recent empirical studies
7
 indicate that, with suitably transformed data, the assumptions 
implicit in multivariate approaches may not be unduly violated in construction contract 
auctions. 
This paper considers, via a case study, the use of one such multivariate approach for 
deriving 'optimal' and other strategic mark up values against known competitors.  Firstly the 
multivariate approach is introduced and the probability of a bidder underbidding his 
competitors formulated.  This is then extended, by the inclusion of a mark-up decision 
variable, into a formulation for 'optimal', 'no loss' and 'breakeven' strategies.  Maximum 
likelihood estimators are proposed for obtaining values of the basic parameters in the model 
from which it is shown how the other parameters may also be estimated.  The paper describes 
how these parameters were estimated from the 'live' case study data and the three strategic 
mark-up values obtained against known competitors. 
 
 
 THE MULTIVARIATE APPROACH 
 
Profit depends on the value of the mark up multiplier, v.  A low mark up increases the 
chance of acquiring a contract, but with little profit, while conversely a high mark up gives a 
larger profit, but with little chance of acquiring the contract.  We propose a model for the 
probability of obtaining a contract as a function of bid, x, or equivalently, v.  Since v=x/c 
where c is the cost estimate, we can choose an additive formulation if we work on a log scale. 
 If for a particular contract, iy , i=1,2 ... ,n are the (log transformed) bids, treated as 
continuous random variables with joint probability density function f(y1, ... ,yn) then 
where f(...) is the joint probability density function of the n bids (n is assumed to be known).  
Now assuming the variables are independent, it follows from (1) that 
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Optimal bidding 
 
 Skitmore
7
 has proposed the model 
 iy ~ ( )2, iiN σµ , independently (3) 
where ( )mwxy ii −= ln , ix is the bid, w is a parameter estimated by the value of the lowest bid 
entered for the contract and m is a modifying constant.  In an empirical analysis of two 
independent sets of construction contract auctions, Skitmore has also shown that any value of 
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 3 
the modifying constant in the range 0≤m≤0.8 will provide a good normalising 
transformation
7
. 
Here we adopt the special case where m=0, and thus ( )ii xy ln= .  If 01 =µ , the 
probability of bidder 1 entering the lowest bid now becomes 
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Applying a mark up multiplier of v to ix  affects the mean in model (3) by an amount of 
ln(v), with the probability, P(v), of entering the lowest bid given by (4) but with zi in (6) now 
replaced by 
i
i
i
vz
z
σ
µσ −+
=
ln11  (7) 
Replacing a bidder's bids with his/her cost estimates, v then represents a mark up 
multiplier and the objective is to find the mark up vo to maximise expected profit.  Since 
profit can be taken as zero for those contracts which we do not win, we need to compute 
 Expected profit [ ] ( )vPwin
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where Xe = cost estimate (a random variable); A = unknown, but assumed fixed, actual cost. 
Assuming cost estimates are unconditionally unbiased
8
, the actual cost can be estimated 
by the expected value of Xe, E[Xe] = µe, say.  Substituting in (8) gives the estimated expected 
profit as 
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which is explicitly 
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where Ce(x) = fe(xwin)P(v) and fe(xwin) is the probability density function (pdf) of Xe given 
that the contract is won.  From Bayes’ formula, we have the conditional distribution of 
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(a standardised, transformed bid), given that the contract is won, given by 
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and p(win) is simply the normalisation constant, P(v), given by (4), (5) and (7).  In the case of 
model (3) 
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Loss Oriented Strategies - 'No loss' and 'Breakeven' 
 
As an alternative to maximising expected profit, a bidder may prefer to restrict the 
probability of making a loss in some way.  One such strategy we term a 'no loss' strategy 
where the mark up, vn, required is the one which results in a (conditional) probability of 0.05 
of making a loss.  This is given where 
 
( )
( )∫ ∞− =
e
p
vP
dxxCeµ , (17) 
where P(v) is given by (4) and Ce(x) is given by (13) and we solve v for p=0.05. 
By adjusting p, the probability of making a loss can be set to any desired value (the 
'breakeven' mark-up, vb, is obtained by solving (17) for p=0.50). 
 
 
Estimation of µi and σi 
 
From data on r bidders over c contracts, Skitmore's
7
 empirical analysis of construction 
contract bids found that bids may be adequately modelled by 
 ( )2,ln ijiijij Niidyx σβα +=  (18) 
where xij is the ith bidder's bid for the jth contract, αi is a bidder location parameter, βj is a 
contract datum parameter (so αi + βj ≈ µij).  We estimate αi, βj, and σi by maximising the 
likelihood of (18).  The log-likelihood is 
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where δij=1 if bidder i bids for contract j, and 0 if bidder i does not bid for contract j, 
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The numerical procedure for solving these equations involves initialising all αi = 0 and 
iterating (21) and (22) to convergence.  The estimates of σi
2
 provided by (23) are adjusted for 
bias (approximately) by multiplying by the factor 
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and for once only bidders (ni = 1) a weighted average of the unbiased variance estimates with 
weights 
 
1
1
−
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N
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For computational purposes it is unnecessary to introduce once only bidders until after 
convergence of the iteration procedure. 
 
 
Application to estimating v for a future contract 
 
Since the αi are bidder effects, we can assume that they will have the same value for a 
future contract and so we can use the estimates obtained above.  The β value for a future 
contract is unknown to us but is tyhe same for all bidders in the contract and need not concern 
us.  The only problem remaining in (10) is the unconditional mean cost estimate µe. 
 
 
Estimation of µe 
 
As µe is the expected value of the (unconditional) cost estimate, ie. setting ln(v)=0, we can 
find an explicit value.  The pdf is that of a log normal distribution, so µe is (recalling that 
µ1=0) 
 2exp 2σµ =e  (27) 
 
 
 A CASE STUDY 
 
To illustrate the practical application of this approach, a set of 'live' bidding data has been 
analysed.  These were donated by a construction company operating in the London area and 
covered all the company’s building contract bidding activities during a 12 month period in the 
early 1980s for a total of 86 contracts.  To preserve confidentiality, all the bidders were 
assigned a code at random, the bidder providing the data having code 304.  Bidder 304's cost 
estimates were included in the data set instead of his bids.  Some of the data were incomplete; 
that is the value of some bids or the identity of the bidders were not known by the company.  
In several cases it was possible to supplement these data from a bidding information agency 
in the London area.  The 51 resulting contracts for which a full set of bids, together wit the 
identity of the bidder, were available for analysis are given in Table 1. 
By first transforming the cost estimates to bids to 
 ijij xy ln=  (28) 
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and then applying the iterative eqns (21) and (22), the estimates αi and σi were obtained for all 
participants, α304 = 0. 
For simplicity, bidder 55 was chosen for analysis, bidder 55 having entered bids for 20 of 
the contracts in the data.  As a result of the iterative procedure, the values of αˆ  and σˆ  for 
bidder 304's cost estimates and bidder 55's bids were found to be 0, 0.00137, 0.06922, and 
0.00257 respectively. 
The probability function for bidder 304's profit was obtained from (4) for a series of mark 
up multipliers, v, the area under which was computed by a suitable quadrature method for 
each percentage point.  Expected profit was calculated by substituting for µe in (27), and then 
finding the v which maximises E[P] in (10).  The estimated values of µe, P(v), and E[P] for a 
range of mark up multipliers are given in Table 2. 
Figs 1 to 3 show the probability curves for bidders 304 and 55 together with bidder 304's 
profit with 0, 5 and 10% mark-up values. 
It can be seen that the profit probability curve becomes progressively flatter with the mean 
value, E[P]/P(v), progressively diminishing relative to the mark up multiplier - a phenomenon 
often termed 'the winner's curse' (see Thaler
9
 for a review of the literature). 
Visual inspection of Table 2 indicates the maximum expected profit to be around 2.7% at 
a mark up multiplier of 8%.  By using a method of successive approximation, the exact 
optimal mark up multiplier was found to be 7.80737% (2.68163% expected profit).  The 
mark-up multipliers for the 'no loss' (p=0.05) and 'breakeven' (p=0.5) strategies were found to 
be 7.50510 and 0.57660 respectively. 
The results for bidders 55 and 221 are given in Table 3.  The αˆ  and σˆ values for bidder 
221 were 0.07971 and 0.00385 respectively and the 'no loss', 'break even' and 'optimal' mark 
up multipliers were found to be 8.39080, 1.05870 and 6.61799 (1.45403 expected profit) 
respectively. 
 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The application of multivariate methods to sealed bid mark-up strategies offers a potential 
improvement on previous bivariate methods in providing a means of better utilisation of all 
available data.  Since it has been shown that, with suitably transformed data, the necessary 
assumptions concerning the statistical properties of bids may not be unduly violated in 
construction contract auctions
7
, a multivariate model has been proposed for deriving 'optimal' 
and other strategic mark up multipliers.  A means of estimating the model parameters was 
described and this has been applied in a case study to obtain the strategic mark-up multipliers 
required against known competitors. 
The major untested assumptions in the method are that (1) the variables are independent 
(ie., bidders do not change their behaviour depending on who their competitors are), this 
could not be true if competitors used the method proposed here; (2) the variables are 
intertemporaly fixed (ie., bidders do not change their behaviour over time), (3) variability is 
stochastic (ie., the error term is truly random), (4) the estimated cost is unconditionally 
unbiased (ie., the conditions supporting 'winner's curse' apply), (5) the number and identity of 
competitors are known in advance of bidding.  Assumptions (1)-(3) are also implicit in the 
Friedman model, and assumption (4) has been considered to be reasonable by Flanagan and 
Norman
8
, who have extensive knowledge of the construction industry.  Although not formally 
allowed in many sealed bid auctions, assumption (5) is generally accepted as being reasonable 
in construction contract auctions where such information may be purchased for the purpose.  
 7 
In the absence of certain knowledge of (5) however, probabilistic methods are available, and 
these have been examined to some extent by Friedman and others. 
The multivariate approach described in this paper is still very much in its formative stages 
and it is clear that some work is yet needed before it can be applied with confidence in 'real-
world' auctions.  In addition to testing the assumptions in the model, the paucity of data in the 
field from which to estimate parameter values suggests that the resulting strategic mark-up 
multiplier estimates, though unbiased, may not be very accurate.  The consequent opportunity 
loss may well be a significant factor.  If this is the case, then it will be appropriate for future 
work in the field to consider the minimisation of such opportunity loss as a strategic option in 
itself. 
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TABLE 1: The 51 bids available for analysis 
 
Project Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid Bdr   Bid 
 
1 150 1454515  55 1514865 304 1475398 134 1468775 154 1447867  73 1457977   1 1386652 
2 304  535608 291  502042 154  529744 157  516376   1  505291 
3  75 1333142 217 1331156 304 1366863 281 1266892 115 1276787  93 1277652 360 1865545   1 1271146 
4 304  696743 292  696972 237  701062  79  637815 361  697826 280  637815 
5  55  404110 304  422297  97  413224 117  389196 362  417489 157  389848   1  389214 
6 134 2116877  99 2169966 293 2187991 304 2161120 221 2198655 137 2296108   8 2165611 117 2153344 294 2133608 
   1 2058210 
7 304 3065742 150 3119689 170 3141641 134 3153800 191 3249927  55 3269768 187 3335993   1 2919754 
8 221 7925257 304 7351929 247 7374650  20 6900000   1 7035339 
9 118  871520 137  899935 304  902378 291  914393  83  950737 221  996483 
10 304 1063337 251 1154023 173 1102272 201 1079657    1 1012702 
11 154 1759614 281 1792123 157 1838532 170 1918066 304 1947733 308 1784215   1 1811845 
12 304 1126816 201 1146398 154 1169795  24 1227296 280 1312527 221 1399472   1 1053099 
13 304  698005 268  625501 308  630288  55  666545   1  652341 
14 364  588810 365  584833  79  639229 145  646341 304  682802 154  691474 
15 303 1429218 291 1493849 304 1511033  12 1521628 366 1526377  55 1717715 
16   6  842319 304  870894 185  883617 
17 367  284947 356  292692 368  294694 152  303700  85  307282 134  313203 369  315727 118  333597 370  334353 
 304  348969 
18 150  461444 304  483862 308  482241  55  447021 154  493417 311  455480 
19 280 2858191 371 2947007 134 2950723 304 2999999  60 3093587   6 3099528 266 3278229 170 3325198 55 3333793 
   1 2884614 
20 276 7831865 304 7837276 256 7859122  55 7904172 152 8047230 293 8145323 117 8279564 134 8657685 1 7646123 
21  55 3971051 304 3854074 372 4724785 154 3955009 373 3944772  79 3731543 237 4001188   1 3705840 
22 292  573485 291  596737 134  597730 201  613528 304  615015 170  621223   1  580203 
23 304 1610942 163 1623447 173 1646286 268 1663742 152 1700000   1 1558574 
24  64 1196036 374 1199328 187 1206837 304 1226589 291 1262082 152 1271000 170 1295954 254 1302161 1 1179413 
25 137 2636397 150 2654728 187 2673906  55 2685127 304 2762123 152 2845567 
26  24  469663 268  476784 286  485870  55  486485 122  504026 263  529468 304  540814   1  515061 
27 201 1526553 152 1533719 148 1698797 304 1876612   1 1770389 
28 201 2106139 304 2175928 308 2210065 280 2223710 221 2255246 117 2296623 266 2331830   1 2062491 
 9 
29 102  499888  55  559596 217  592026 170  602042 304  608957 134  619065 
30 304 2639525 308 2842407 280 2874130  55 2861665 152 2736300 256 2770720   1 2538005 
31 304  732572 365  599429 145  623906  79  691759 154  744332 364  607065  
32 134  546641 268  539565  55  608242  24  538382 170  599934 304  559351   1  530190 
33 221  792966  99  811788 308  819971  55  847621 137  847892 304  853793 
34 152 2085151 107 2130217 280 2150583 115 2203956 137 2219653 154 2241687 304 2325900 
35 268  821617 115  844579 303  848459 304  871927 106  872215 375  935765   1  830407 
36 304  792474  24  747374 217  778559 252  743788 268  808345 170  835465   1  754737 
37 304 7279854  60 7650271 308 7029448 150 6631664 193 7089879 170 7230120 247 6986341 191 7143710 266 6794553 
   1 7067819 
38 304  592096 150  573997 217  518613 121   508985 376  544480   1  550787 
39 348  538600 377  567031 378  621365 268  699839  72  825451 190  991468 304 1001254 
40 154 2087946 276 2104017 186 2183122 304 2205359 280 2212382 112 2267987 221 2332476 294 2400000 
41 247 1503739  24 1536654 304 1576905 154 1583595 294 1616432 157 1704995   1 1530976 
42 191 3624453 221 3694803 304 3732133 170 3751115 193 3773967  55 3866339 134 3922937 281 4122448 1 3641105 
43 157  629164 173  695284 311  723315 266  729305 304  743578 379  768189 
44 304 2252833  24 2264310 112 2274380 191 2323385  55 2384494   1 2187217 
45 163 1202916  55 1268733 221 1291365 304 1294986 
46 217 2968891 280 2772626 186 2822857 134 2972189 276 2821600 304 2857275 221 2793000   1 2787585 
47 286 1398400 152 1401500 237 1427140 304 1436804 301 1453070  55 1511643 371 1591986  83 1665760 1 1381542 
48 294  698161  24  709676 291  758565 304  789355 134  797926  55  842684 252  751677   1  751767 
49  31  248733 291  251007 252  251415 380  261286 304  264933 
50 293  358840 217  362370 304  386983 381  421797 154  456272   1  351803 
51 317  527692 311  570874  75  588854 173  609221 308  636451 304  694297   1  645858 
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TABLE 2: Results for a range of mark up multipliers (against bidder 55) 
 
v(%) v ln(v) P(v) E[P] E[P]/P(v) 
0.0 1.00 0.00000 0.86476 -0.48082 -0.55602 
1.0 1.01 0.00995 0.82730 0.25725 0.31095 
2.0 1.02 0.01980 0.78427 0.91031 1.16071 
3.0 1.03 0.02956 0.73610 1.46750 1.99362 
4.0 1.04 0.03922 0.68351 1.92084 2.81025 
5.0 1.05 0.04879 0.62748 2.26607 3.61136 
6.0 1.06 0.05827 0.56918 2.50317 4.39784 
7.0 1.07 0.06766 0.50989 2.63646 5.17060 
8.0 1.08 0.07696 0.45094 2.67433 5.93061 
9.0 1.09 0.08618 0.39357 2.62858 6.67881 
10.0 1.10 0.09531 0.33892 2.51345 7.41610 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: Results for a range of mark up multipliers (against bidders 55 and 221) 
 
v(%) v ln(v) P(v) E[P] E[P]/P(v) 
0.0 1.00 0.00000 0.99219 -0.70731 -0.92451 
1.0 1.01 0.00995 0.99951 -0.08586 -0.12074 
2.0 1.02 0.01980 1.00625 0.43161 0.66160 
3.0 1.03 0.02956 1.01238 0.83968 1.42326 
4.0 1.04 0.03922 1.01787 1.13790 2.16519 
5.0 1.05 0.04879 1.02272 1.33097 2.88848 
6.0 1.06 0.05827 1.02692 1.42837 3.59430 
7.0 1.07 0.06766 1.03050 1.44345 4.28383 
8.0 1.08 0.07696 1.03350 1.39210 4.95823 
9.0 1.09 0.08618 1.03598 1.29136 5.61863 
10.0 1.10 0.09531 1.03798 1.15792 6.26609 
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